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[In the following, CAU editorial board member Malcolm Gordon reflects on the Cold War, the
Reagan Doctrine, and the importance of a "victory" in Nicaragua toward reasserting US hegemony
on a world-scale. Gordon was a contributor to BEFORE THE POINT OF NO RETURN (ed. by Leon
Wofsy, New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1986), consisting of perspectives on the Cold
War, the Reagan Doctrine, and "what is to be done." Other contributors include Noam Chomsky,
Rev. Theodore Hesburgh, Hans Bethe, Tom Wicker, Diana Johnstone, Edward P. Thompson and Gil
Green. Gordon, retired professor of biochemistry at the University of New Mexico (Albuquerque,
NM), is active in Central America solidarity and other peace movement organizations.] Introduction
President Reagan has been accused of monumental blunders. At Reykjavik he was charged with
almost giving away the nuclear store. In the Iran-contra deal he violated his pledge to ostracize
nations he had labeled as terrorist. The President, we are told, was ill-advised, or at worst, didn't
really know what was going on in his name. That the White House is so eager to embrace these
explanations is enough to make one suspicious. However, such explanations do not bear scrutiny
on more substantive grounds. Reykjavik and the Iran-contra scandal are connected and they
were not blunders. They were logical, almost inevitable, outcomes of the Reagan Doctrine, i.e.,
the administration's world-wide counter-revolutionary program carried out under the difficult
conditions of substantial domestic and foreign opposition. "Secret" Third World wars led to
Reykjavik just as they did the Iran-contra deal. What happened at Reykjavik? Upon his assumption
of office, Gorbachev launched a series of sweeping proposals for an arms control agreement with the
United States. These proposals culminated in the unilateral Soviet test ban of August 6, 1985, and
the January 1986 proposal to eliminate all nuclear weapons by the year 2000. It was difficult to ignore
Gorbachev since he had evoked unprecedented hope that humanity might yet survive the nuclear
age. Thus, a Reagan-Gorbachev meeting became a political imperative. Reagan reluctantly agreed
to go to Reykjavik but with a carefully planned strategy, which can be summarized as preserving
the arms race and laying the blame on Gorbachev. There was every reason to believe the Reagan
plan would succeed. Despite the military, industrial and technological superiority of the US and
its allies, the US geo-political agenda is limited by Soviet nuclear power. In the atomic age military
superiority counts for little if the enemy can impose unacceptable destruction. It followed that
while the Soviets might agree to an unequal treaty, as they did in Salt I and II, they could not agree
to a pact that canceled their nuclear trump. Essential for the success of the White House strategy
were French and English nuclear forces. The US excluded its two allies from the negotiations.
So at Reykjavik Reagan played his chips. But Gorbachev agreed not to count English and French
nuclear forces, while proposing that all intermediate range missiles be removed from Europe and
acquiescing to the US demand that deployment of such missiles in Asia be limited. The Soviet
premier reiterated his proposal for the reduction of all US and Soviet nuclear forces by 50% in a fiveyear period, and total elimination by the year 2000. He agreed to on-site inspection and a mutual
reduction in Warsaw and NATO pact countries' conventional forces. It is not clear who proposed
the elimination of all ballistic missiles by the year 2000, but we know that Gorbachev supported
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the idea. The risks that the Soviet Union was willing to take in exchange for a breathing spell to
address its internal problems were underestimated. Only on Star Wars the invitation to a new arms
race, whose development was dependent upon on increasingly sophisticated nuclear arms did
Gorbachev balk. Only Star Wars was left as the ostensible excuse to break off negotiations. With
"Thank God for Star Wars...," an unidentified member of Margaret Thatcher's cabinet heaved a
sigh of relief. Who was in command at Reykjavik? President Reagan did not engage in this game on
his own. The US delegation included leading arms specialists and the ideologues who had crafted
US arms and foreign policy since the beginning of his Administration. While Reagan acted as
spokesman, there is no doubt that he articulated a consensus of the "experts'" view. If Reykjavik was
a disaster, it certainly was not Reagan's alone. The evidence for this view is overwhelming. Secretary
of State George Shultz was shaken, and White House Chief of Staff Don Regan almost incoherent
as they brooded in front of the TV cameras. House Speaker Tip O'Neill and President Jimmy Carter
report frantic calls begging for advice on how the US might avoid world-wide condemnation for
failure at Reykjavik. Within two hours, O'Neill reports, damage control was in place. Reykjavik
was not a failure, the world was assured. The media was informed much progress had been made:
"We stand on the brink of a significant agreement with the Soviet Union." Although the Soviets
made it very clear that no agreement without stringent limits on Star Wars was possible, the US
attempt to deflect criticism by false optimism was largely successful, and even survived almost
immediate confirmation that the White House had not entered the negotiations in good faith. A
contrived diplomatic crisis, the failure of the Geneva talks and the unilateral breach of the Salt
II agreement by the US, followed Reykjavik in quick succession. Later Regan proudly compared
his post-summit activities to a shovel brigade that follows a parade. What Regan did not say is
that he performed a dual role, as both a participant and as the leading shoveler. Why did the U.S.
say no at Reykjavik? When the President announced Star Wars he sold it as a program to make
nuclear weapons obsolete. It was to be an impenetrable shield that would permit humanity to
bask in the security of never experiencing high energy weapons beamed down upon it from space.
But at Reykjavik the dream of a non-nuclear world was in Reagan's grasp. The dream could be
realized without the long, expensive and uncertain wait to determine the efficacy of Star Wars.
More important, Star Wars is irrelevant in the absence of ballistic missiles. The US, and the Soviet
Union too, would be released from the threat of a nuclear holocaust. This is what Reagan rejected.
Certainly the President and his advisors do not look forward to a nuclear war. They know that Star
Wars, even by the most optimistic projections, could not provide meaningful protection to the US
population. Even a few megaton weapons, which certainly would penetrate the most sophisticated
space umbrella, would produce unacceptable destruction. Military superiority in the atomic age
is an illusion. Nor is it plausible that the Administration believes otherwise. We must conclude
that nuclear arms race serves other purposes. The Reagan Doctrine, the Arms Race and the Third
World What has come to be known as the Reagan Doctrine summarizes the administration's foreign
policy. Its essence is world-wide counter-revolution. The doctrine commits the US to subverting
any country that has escaped or might escape US hegemony. The rationale of the doctrine is the
"Soviet threat." Every third world country with an independent foreign policy is then transformed
into an instrument of Soviet imperialism, justifying US intervention in the name of a national
security boundary that encompasses the entire planet. A reduction in US-Soviet tensions cannot
be accommodated within the context of this policy. In brief, the Reagan Doctrine and disarmament
are simply incompatible. Reykjavik was a preordained failure. Iran and Nicaragua Nicaragua ranks
first among the administration's counter-revolutionary wars. As the President said in 1983 when
appealing for contra aid, "...[I]f we cannot win here, we can win nowhere." Neither the Congress
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nor the American people were convinced of the necessity for war against Nicaragua. But counterrevolution brooked no pause. If the remarkable early successes of the Nicaraguan revolution were
consolidated, other nations might follow in the Sandinistas' path. The administration proceeded in
the only way possible. Secret wars, hidden from public view in the basement of the White House,
illegally financed, in violation of the constitution and the will of Congress, became the order of
the day. Long before Irangate Congress was aware of numerous violations of the law by the White
House. In 1983 the Boland Amendment was passed to prevent unlawful activities by the CIA in
Nicaragua. Time and again individual members of Congress unsuccessfully called for investigations
of violations of the law that had come to their attention: drug trafficking by the contras; illegal arms
shipments; mining of Nicaraguan ports; the CIA-inspired program of civilian murders in Nicaragua;
and, most recently, the persons and activities revealed during the Hasenfus incident. Nor, like the
World Court, was Congress ignorant of violations of international law. The Iran-contra scandal,
however, was a different matter. It sent shock waves through the American body politic, and could
not be ignored. Will Congress conduct a thorough investigation? Powerful figures in Congress
who had thwarted earlier investigations, are now reduced to containing them. Foremost on their
agenda is to limit the investigation to Iran. The myriad of unlawful activities in Central America,
extending back to the earliest days of the Reagan administration must be out of bounds. Irangate
is to be presented as the concoction of a lieutenant colonel and a vice admiral, acting without
presidential authority or knowledge. At worst the president's culpability must be limited to his
failing intellectual powers. The Reagan Doctrine itself must survive. Yet, even the very preliminary
investigation by the Senate Intelligence Committee makes containing the investigations difficult.
Already uncovered are unprecedented violations of law, including the CIA manipulation of air
support for the contras; the diversion of funds from private sources as well as from arms deals to
the contras; the blatant contradictions between deposed National Security Council aide Lt. Col.
Oliver North's chronology and the testimony of Donald Regan; and, evidence that some of the
Iranian funds were diverted to influence the 1986 elections. The latter may be the most threatening
of all revelations for the administration. Watergate destroyed Nixon's presidency, not because of its
links to the Vietnam war, but because of the attempt to influence the outcome of the 1972 elections.
Congressional vision is 20/20 when it surveys its incumbency. It is by no means certain that Reagan's
illegalities will convince Congress to remove the cancer of the Nicaraguan war. The US as the center
of international counter-revolution is dear to the hearts of more than one member of Congress. But
support for continuing the Nicaraguan war was always marginal. The $100 million contra aid bill
passed by just a few votes after years of unprecedented presidential pressure. Earlier reservations
are compounded by the anger at Irangate and the use of Iranian arms profits to defeat opponents of
contra aid in the 1986 elections. While it is probable that the investigation will frustrate the plan to
have the good soldiers, North and Vice Admiral John Poindexter, shoulder all blame, an end to the
illegal wars that bred the conspiracy is not so sure. Though many in Congress are determined to rid
the body politic of the contra infection, their success, as in the case of Watergate, depends upon the
American people.

-- End --
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